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Reconstruction of Social Studies1
William Gaudelli and Megan J. Laverty
The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of 
social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand.
—John Dewey2
Abstract
As the world grows increasingly contentious, education for citizenship demands 
greater attention. Yet at this perilous juncture, social studies has neglected to take up 
the task of preparing citizens in a democratic and global society. Social studies has 
become increasingly fragmented and isolated by disciplinary foci that fetishize aca-
demic pursuits over broadly social purposes, precisely what Dewey warned against 
and which represent but a small portion of its functions. The academic-only social 
studies education has created a temporal disconnection that affirms the prepara-
tion for future life rather than, as Dewey preferred, the school as life itself. Dewey 
tasked the school with providing a context for social intelligence, power, and inter-
ests. When subject matter, like history and geography, is approached from a social 
perspective, it is viewed as expressing social life and affecting social development, 
not only as an academic end unto itself. We draw from Dewey’s theory of social 
learning an intention to reorient social studies education in ways that point to the 
future, engage diversity toward common goals, and ultimately expand the social 
power of school subjects so that each is in effect a form of social study.
Introduction
In society today, we are inundated with reports on climate change, nuclear acci-
dents, sectarian violence, terrorism, school shootings, police brutality, shrill main-
stream politics, dire poverty, civil wars, and migration crises. As we observe their 
proliferation and escalation, it can feel as if we lack not only solutions to these social 
ills, but, even more fundamentally, ways to communicate about and make sense of 
their conditions and consequences. Unfortunately, our failure to parse these events 
will not make them go away. To the contrary, their full impact will be endured for 
generations to come.
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As with other periods of transition and upheaval, this moment presents a 
ripe pedagogical opportunity. Schools are natural venues for intervention in the 
course of history: they provide a forum in which to apprise students of the facts of 
events, involve them in intelligent deliberations about what is fast becoming their 
social life, and thereby provide them with the analytic resources to effect change. 
Dewey foresaw this transformative capacity as the very core of the school’s potential 
to create more peaceful and harmonious societies: “When the school introduces 
and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, 
saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments 
of self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society 
which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious.”3 Here, Dewey expresses his appreciation 
for the immense potential of schools to inculcate compassion, a sense of justice, 
and autonomy among students. These are dispositions he knew to be vital to the 
project of achieving democratic and global citizenship. 
It is no accident that social studies educators, in particular, position themselves 
and their field as inheritors of Dewey’s progressive educational legacy. They have long 
held that Dewey spoke to them directly, given his emphasis on the fundamentally social 
nature of learning and the need to orient that learning toward the service of social 
goods. And indeed, given that Dewey’s pedagogy was fundamentally an endeavor 
in social inquiry, social studies as a discipline seems uniquely suited for the task that 
Dewey originally assigned to schools generally. A quick look at contemporary research 
corroborates this affinity, showing established principles that learning is a social act 
(NCSS, 2010), statements of what constitutes powerful and purposeful social studies 
(NCSS, 2009), and a plethora of Dewey citations and Dewey-inspired projects.
Despite this historical affinity, social studies education has significantly 
diverged from what Dewey envisaged for it and the school, as the field has become 
increasingly isolated and internally fragmented. Our sense is that an academic 
climate that rewards ever-specializing discourse, be it in historical understand-
ing, citizenship education, multicultural studies, social justice education, global 
education, or any number of versions and varieties now current under the broad 
umbrella of social studies education, has driven the field to a breaking point where 
its very existence has been called into question. Note the fact that the most recent 
policy initiatives in the United States—No Child Left Behind (2002), Race to the 
Top (2010), and the Every Student Succeeds Act (2015)—systematically omit social 
studies from frontline consideration as a field. These policies have precipitated a 
decline in the amount of time spent on social studies learning across the United 
States.5 Social studies as a K–12 subject area is in retreat from what was arguably an 
already diminished position vis-à-vis literacy and numeracy among policy makers 
and the general public. The fracturing and fragmentation of the field can only con-
tribute to its further diminution when there is an existential question about what 
exactly the field provides young people and society. These conditions suggest a need 
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to revisit the field’s foundations, to which Dewey’s thinking is integral, in an effort 
to revitalize social studies education in schools and the academy. Our plan is thus 
to imagine what social studies education ought to be in this century, in light of the 
weighty issues on the near horizon, through a rereading of Dewey.
Dewey argued that all knowledge acquisition in school and society requires 
an integrative social or cultural education. That there are discrete subjects such 
as “World Geography” and “U.S. History” indicates that Dewey’s intentions for 
geography and history to serve as the connective tissue of learning about society 
in all of its temporal and spatial dimensions have been missed or misconstrued. 
Dewey offers:
The meaning with which activities become charged, concern nature and 
man. This is an obvious truism, which however gains meaning when trans-
lated into educational equivalents. So translated, it signifies that geography 
and history supply subject matter which gives background and outlook, 
intellectual perspective, to what might otherwise be narrow personal 
actions or mere forms of technical skill. With every increase of ability to 
place our own doings in their time and space connections, our doings gain 
in significant content.6
Thus, we argue that a rereading of Dewey’s thinking is in order to show that social 
studies ought instead to be part and parcel of the general education of all teachers 
and students, suffused within all curriculum: science, math, language, literature, 
physical education, art, music, and, indeed, the entirety of schools.
Dewey was famously skeptical of claims to expertise, an argument he devel-
oped in The Public and Its Problems as part of an ongoing debate with Walter 
Lippmann about the nature of democratic society. His argument was not intended 
to downplay the value of highly knowledgeable individuals or the accumulation of 
their learning; indeed, he recognized that the ever-increasing complexity of moder-
nity required such forms of expertise. Still, he remained faithful to the notion that 
an education befitting modernity is one that draws out a method of intelligence 
through reflective experience, and so he preferred a generalized orientation toward 
knowledge—one might say in democratized fashion—to allegiance to experts, a 
preoccupation with expertise, and the knowledge-action that issued from both.7
Dewey insists that terms such as “science,” “politics,” and “religion” refer to 
aspects, emphases, or trends exhibited by experience, not discrete realms of knowl-
edge. He cautions his readers not to separate and institutionalize these trends. 
Dewey writes:
Narrowness, superficiality, stagnation follow from lack of nourishment 
which can be supplied only by generous and wide interactions. Goods 
isolated as professionalism and institutionalization isolate them, pet-
rify; and in a moving world solidification is always dangerous. . . . Over- 
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specialization and division of interests, occupations and goods create the 
need for a generalized medium of intercommunication, of mutual criti-
cisms through all-around translation from one separated region of experi-
ence into another. Thus philosophy as a critical organ becomes in effect a 
messenger, a liaison officer, making reciprocally intelligible voices speaking 
provincial tongues, and thereby enlarging as well as rectifying the mean-
ings with which they are charged.8
For Dewey, reciprocal intelligibility across regions of experience is essential, since 
ultimately the point of any knowledge for a pragmatist is the work it can do. Merely 
amassing expert knowledge, or contributing to a tributary of that expertise, is insuf-
ficient by Dewey’s standards; the knowledge must be intelligible or translatable in 
a social context. 
We argue that the field of social studies has become fragmented and isolated 
in the very ways that Dewey warned against, and that his philosophy should be 
used to reconstruct social studies education, which began with such promise in 
the early twentieth century. We argue that Dewey provides a model for how to 
reimagine social studies such that all educators would conceive of themselves as 
teachers of social study. Indeed, the very presence of “social studies educators” 
illustrates the problem that we highlight herein: the isolation of a social outlook 
to a single field, and its consequent removal from all others. We have divided our 
argument into three sections. In the first section we provide a brief and limited 
overview of social studies discourse today, with a focus on the trend toward spe-
cialization. In the second section, we interpret Dewey’s writings on philosophy 
and education to show that he shared our concern that social intelligence, social 
power, and social interests be infused throughout the curriculum and school. In 
the third and final section of the paper, we return to contemporary social stud-
ies with a view to making concrete recommendations for how it might be recon-
structed in light of our criticisms.
Social Studies Today
There has always been a natural affinity between social studies as a scholastic field 
and the academic disciplines to which it is most closely related. The National Coun-
cil for the Social Studies, for example, defines the field as oriented toward citizen-
ship through coordinated, systematic study, drawing upon “such disciplines as 
anthropology, archaeology, economics, geography, history, law, philosophy, political 
science, psychology, religion, and sociology.”9 The field of social studies has sought 
to establish its legitimacy as an academic discipline in its own right. In doing so, 
however, it erred by substituting the aims of an academic discipline for those of a 
school-based subject that addresses social needs. The tension between social studies 
as a set of academic disciplines and social studies as a school-based subject has been 
an ongoing dynamic in the field’s development.10 We are particularly interested, 
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however, in the way that specialization, or one might say the disciplinary and aca-
demic nature of social studies, manifests in the present situation. 
The tendency to construe social studies as a set of academic disciplines is well 
illustrated in the recent line of work around thinking like a historian11 or the need 
for political science discourse to orient citizenship education.12 Students are intro-
duced to the domains of thought proper to the discipline. In the former, students 
are exposed to historical-thinking skills such as corroboration, contextualization, 
reading, and sourcing, based on the assumption that such a focus will permeate 
novel situations where these skills are needed. In the case of the latter, students 
develop a critical and analytic “inside politics” viewpoint through examination of 
strategy, rhetoric, and electoral processes—attributes that permit a sophisticated 
understanding of citizenship. These educational movements are not problematic 
in and of themselves, as learning to think like a historian or conceiving civic space 
from the vantage point of a political scientist has real merit. The problem arises 
when these modes of thought are reified as skills whose acquisition supplants the 
larger aim of social studies: to develop thoughtful, socially responsible beings. 
This reification occurs when particular ways of thinking come to be seen 
as “of the essence” of a single discipline, even though they are manifest in myriad 
other situations and locales. We see the tendency to overdetermine and cordon off 
“a way of thinking” when social studies is viewed as a field of amalgamated disci-
plines—simply a composite of other fields of knowledge—rather than a thing unto 
itself. One example of this would be the emphasis on historical thinking in social 
studies education, especially insofar as it is defined by the skills it entails:
Sourcing, or the act of considering the source of the document when deter-
mining its evidentiary value; corroboration, in which the details of one 
document are compared with those of another before accepting such details 
as fact; and contextualization, the act of creating a spatial and temporal 
context for a historical event.13
Cognitive categories like sourcing, corroboration, close reading, and contextu-
alization are construed as historical thinking, yet claims about the disciplinary 
uniqueness of such cognitive processes are suspect. That these ways of thinking 
can be found in virtually every aspect of life is rarely considered by advocates of 
specialization. Farmers, for example, are knowledgeable about sources of para-
sites; anglers corroborate tidal conditions that precipitate fish-runs; masons pay 
close attention to context such as air temperature and humidity in order to make 
an effective pour of concrete; dramaturges engage in close reading of play scripts 
as they move into production. The list goes on and on. Indeed, myriad activities 
involve all of these thought modes intermittently and with syncopation. To argue 
that these modes of thought are specific and unique to historians is difficult to 
sustain; rather, the application of these worthy thinking skills is fundamentally 
human, not exclusively historical. 
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Specialization of thought-modes, a source of fragmentation within the field 
of social studies, is concomitant with a rise in information accessibility that is part 
and parcel of living in a digital, global age. As a rapidly growing mass of informa-
tion becomes increasingly available, there arises a desire to rein in its breadth and 
intensity, and sort through its varying degrees of quality. Wineburg and Martin’s 
account of Pakistani middle school students’ failure to effectively navigate this 
mass of information is illustrative here.14 The authors observed students with lim-
ited background information trying to ascertain the validity of the Pakistan gov-
ernment’s claim that it is a democracy. Ultimately, they found that students lacked 
the wherewithal to effectively evaluate the claim and recognize that Pakistan is, in 
fact, not generally regarded as a parliamentary democracy. The intended takeaway 
is that teachers and students ought to adopt specialization and teach students the 
ability to corroborate claims so that they would accept this claim as true. The par-
ticular situation notwithstanding, they invoke this tale to remind educators about 
the recklessness of undisciplined inquiry. 
This conclusion about the value of disciplinary thought, however, is flawed 
in at least two respects: namely, with respect to ineffectiveness and nontransfer-
ability. First, with respect to ineffectiveness, the digital and global media age is rife 
with conflicting, asymmetrical, disjointed, and patently false information coming 
from many sides simultaneously. That educators could somehow inoculate young 
people against this cacophony of discordance by teaching them about distant his-
torical events is difficult to imagine. A typical U.S. student will spend a maximum 
of 200 of his or her 8,760 yearly hours studying history. This is a remarkably small 
percentage (~2.3 percent) when compared to the time spent interacting with vari-
ous media and being bombarded by the passing messages of the media age. The 
suggestion that engaging in historical study for this small percentage of time, and 
only this time, can prevent students from taking Pakistani government claims at 
face value is implausible. If one could demonstrate transferability of these skills, 
however, concerns about effectiveness could be allayed. 
Yet, the second flaw lies just there—in the presumed transferability of disci-
plinary thought. Advocates of disciplinary specialization assume that historical-
thinking skills are readily transferable to the analysis of contemporary events that 
bear no direct relationship to the history being studied. Read-aloud protocols that 
permit insights into how historians reason through contradictions in evidence 
and develop working theories that are evidence-based rather than teleological—
assuming history as an unfolding destiny—illustrate the nuance and complexity of 
historical thinking.15 These claims are sound as they apply to historians, for sure. 
What is missing, however, is a clear demonstration of transferability beyond the 
quasi-experimental settings that studies like these organize. Does a young person 
educated in this setting naturally think this way when presented with an assertion 
in a setting far-removed from the artificiality of the classroom context? This claim 
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is crucial to the historical thinking-as-social-studies movement, and yet it cannot 
be proven; indeed, it is suspect. Moreover, if one sustains our earlier point that these 
historical-thinking skills are indeed human thinking skills, then sourcing them 
in the domain of historical study is also problematic. Might not students learn the 
same things from raising crops or building a home? Perhaps.
Moreover, given the disciplinary confines within which these skills are taught 
and learned, it would be problematic to assume that students are able to simply 
intuit when to activate them, or how to transfer one’s orientation to, say, a historical 
document into everyday cognition about one’s own life. Students are deeply social-
ized by schools to separate subject matters and corresponding learning processes 
along disciplinary lines such that in cases of, for instance, mathematics and Eng-
lish literature, they are unable to recognize any resemblance or affinity between 
the two. Indeed, this is the deep grammar of specialization and school organized 
under an industrial model. Corroborative thinking or sourcing claims can indeed 
be cultivated in school. Yet, life comes to us whole-cloth, not in ready-made parcels 
of information. This is the trouble with school curricula generally, and especially 
social studies in its particularizing mode: the organization of subject matter does not 
fit the naturalistic way students do and will encounter the world. And the hope that 
practicing such thinking skills will transfer to novel situations is dubious. Again, 
within the confines of academic learning, historical thinking and political science 
knowledge have great value and indeed have promoted instructional practice that 
moves beyond rote didacticism toward student engagement. But these conditions 
alone do not move social studies sufficiently into the realm of social education the 
likes of which Dewey had in mind. 
Social studies education is suffering, then, from a problem of specialization. 
The cost of moving in this direction is that social studies education now fosters 
inquiries that are narrowly focused on disciplinary ways of thinking, which myo-
pically occlude its properly social purposes. It no longer provides students with 
the opportunity to inquire into issues of pressing, universal concern, like climate 
change, geopolitical violence, and migration crises. These are the very sorts of social 
issues that, according to Dewey, individuals and communities need to address if 
they are going to be resolved. Dewey was calling for a study of the social. Social 
studies could fulfill that office if it only understood itself not through the lens of 
other academic disciplines, themselves ill-suited to problems of contemporary civ-
ics, but as a direct response to Dewey’s call. 
Dewey on History, Geography, and Philosophy
Dewey discusses social studies in chapters 16 and 21 of Democracy and Educa-
tion: “The Significance of Geography and History” and “Physical and Social Stud-
ies: Naturalism and Humanism” respectively. He holds that there is “a right and 
wrong way of conceiving [a subject’s] value.”16 How we conceive of a subject’s value 
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shapes the way we learn and teach it, and its potential role in social life. For Dewey, 
geography aims at the earth’s “natural relations of sympathy and association with 
human life”17 and the fact that history cultivates “a more intelligent sympathetic 
understanding of the social situations of the present in which individuals share is a 
permanent and constructive moral asset.”18 Ideally, these subjects bring about “the 
enlargement of the significance of a direct personal experience.”19 
Dewey explains that geography and history provide contexts for the local and 
the present; without geography and history the meaning of the local and the present 
is reduced. Dewey writes: “With every increase of ability to place our own doings 
in their time and space connections, our doings gain in significant content.”20 He 
qualifies his remark, insisting that our ordinary experiences will not be enlarged in 
meaning unless what is studied is “animated and made real by entering into imme-
diate activity.”21 Progressive educators have interpreted Dewey as recommending 
that students be involved in those everyday activities and experiences including, 
for example, cooking, hammering, and walking, of which he writes positively. 
Certainly Dewey is making a pedagogical point here. He objects to the teaching of 
“curious facts to be laboriously learned” because such an approach to education 
contributes to the “deadness of topics.” For example, he is concerned that geogra-
phy not become a “hodge-podge of unrelated fragments” or a “veritable rag-bag 
of intellectual odds and ends: The height of a mountain here, the course of a river 
there, the quantity of shingles produced in this town, the tonnage of the shipping 
in that, the boundary of a county, the capital of a state.”22
To its credit, the teaching of social studies has moved away from “recapitulat-
ing, cataloging and refining what is already known.”23 Nonetheless, it has failed to 
appreciate Dewey’s broader disciplinary point. The field of social studies does not 
ignite the social imagination of students. Instead of being awakened to the profound 
influence and consequence of customs, traditions, and institutions, students feel 
instead as if they must learn to demarcate the different realms of human existence: 
geographic, economic, political, and social. Thus, students fail to connect the potency 
of social influence with the formation of their own attitudes, aspirations, and pos-
sibilities. We contend that Dewey’s central thesis in the chapters on geography and 
history has been missed or misconstrued, namely that the “educational center of 
gravity is in the cultural or human aspects of the subject. From this center, any mate-
rial becomes relevant in so far as it is needed to help appreciate the significance of 
human activities and relations.”24 In this section, our goal is to elucidate the think-
ing that informs Dewey’s recommendation and explain why it has gone unheeded.
In the study of geography we consider our spatial relations and must, accord-
ing to Dewey, always conceive them as whole. Similarly, in the study of history and 
our temporal relations, we must treat the past, present, and future as continuous. It 
is within the context of the continuities that we see “the things that fundamentally 
concern all men in common.”25 In the later chapter, “Physical and Social Studies: 
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Naturalism and Humanism,” Dewey underscores the intimate interdependence 
of geography and history. He writes that “man is continuous with nature, not an 
alien entering her process from without.”26 Nature is not exclusively materialistic 
and mechanistic, just as humanity is not entirely idealistic and autonomous; nature 
and humanity exist in dynamic relationship with one another, which can be char-
acterized in various ways. This dynamic relationship of humanity and nature is 
manifest in Dewey’s philosophy of experience, as well as in his conception of cul-
ture, which, Dewey came to believe, “fully and freely” conveyed his “philosophy 
of experience”27; culture, unlike experience, encompasses “the immense diversity 
of human affairs, interests, concerns [and] values.”28
According to Dewey, experience is a temporal process characterized by a 
cyclical rhythm of acting and undergoing, always directed toward restoring func-
tional unity. His example is that of breathing:
Breathing involves taking in air in such a way that the air taken in is chemi-
cally charged with deleterious energies, destructive of the maintenance 
of the function. But breathing as function also expels the poisoned air as 
well as oxygenates the blood. The changes in the energy quality of the air 
involved in the function bring about changes in the other constituent ener-
gies such that the function is sustained.29
What we distinguish as subjective (self, subject, individual, or organism) and objec-
tive (object, world, other, external, or, for instance, air chemically charged with 
deleterious energies) refers “to phases or stages in a series.”30 Subjective factors 
contribute to the “going on” of the process; objective factors obstruct it and are 
converted into referential meanings. Dewey contrasts referential meanings with 
immanent meanings or values while emphasizing that the distinction is “one of 
phase and emphasis,” for he concludes that “every meaning in the concrete is both 
referential and immanent.”31 In the case of his example, respiration is a value because 
it “completes the meaning of the processes which lead to it, which if examined are 
found to require it, to indicate it or to point to it as their own fulfilled meaning.”32
Experience is, in essence, “a moving equilibrium of integration.”33 Its quality 
depends on the connections between “doing, undergoing, [and] subsequent doing.”34 
Human experience is distinctively social: it is characterized by “communication, 
participation, sharing, [and] communion.”35 As interdependent social beings our 
functions are expanded to include such activities as the performative and visual arts, 
storytelling, economics, the judicial system, and understanding—otherwise referred 
to as culture. Formally speaking, culture is subject to the same cyclical rhythms as 
experience. Any given state of affairs is going to be characterized by material con-
straints that inspire individuals to improve the given state of affairs. The imagined 
possibilities conceived in response to the given state of affairs suggest something to be 
done on the part of individuals, thereby promoting ingenuity, effort, and action. The 
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effect of this activity is to produce knowledge of and modifications in nature.36 These 
modifications produce a new state of affairs with inherent material constraints that 
inspire individuals to improve the given state of affairs. And so the cycle continues.
Dewey’s account of culture emphasizes the conjoint expansion of humanity 
and nature by means of inquiry and experimentation. Thus, Dewey uses the term 
“mind” to describe culture in order to underscore the fact that culture uniquely 
“allows us to participate in a shared life of meaning and value; it is the basis for our 
having a sense of self and sense of other.”37 Given that a large part of our shared life 
is conducted in the realm of meanings, our ability to achieve our common pur-
pose—“the richest and fullest experience possible”—is thwarted when meanings 
conflict.38 Inconsistency results from our competing interests: scientific versus eco-
nomic; conservative versus progressive; personal versus professional; institutional 
versus individual. Such conflicts are generative nonetheless because they stimulate 
individuals to develop a more comprehensive understanding. Thus, if culture is to 
deepen and expand, it must include the kind of criticism that (a) looks at the values 
animating human behavior or activity, (b) questions those values, and (c) submits 
actual criticism to even further criticism.
Such criticism is conservative and prospective, thereby ensuring the continu-
ity of culture. One of its main purposes is to identify traditional values that are to be 
maintained and strengthened for future generations; such values are to be passed on 
as “more solid and secure, more accessible and more generously shared than [those] 
we have received.”39 For example, marriage is an institution that continues to find 
support within heterosexual communities and has now been extended and adapted 
to include same-sex couples. A related function of criticism is to identify those “val-
ues which have become obsolete with the command of new resources, showing what 
values are merely sentimental because there are no means for their realization.”40 One 
such value is men’s chivalrous treatment of women: opening doors, walking on the 
outside of the sidewalk, and accompanying women home after an evening out. Such 
chivalry only makes sense against a background of sexual difference, “the idea that 
a person is essentially characterized as a man or a woman, that this belongs to who 
he is, who she is, and that one’s sex is not like the color of one’s hair.”41
Criticism aims to make sense of why we do what we do, allowing us to become 
conscious of the present in relationship to the past as well as to future possibilities. It 
seeks understanding of ideas as they enter and order our experience: what happens 
to us, how we behave in response to what happens to us, and the consequent shape 
of our lives. Because criticism seeks “to clarify, liberate and extend the goods which 
inhere in the naturally generated functions of experience,” it emancipates the full 
meaning of experience and liberates the human spirit.42 It promotes human freedom, 
which is important for realizing “the potentialities of an individual and of social 
progress.”43 Criticism enables societies to actively shape their futures by, for example, 
choosing to isolate and eliminate those practices that have lost their intelligibility and 
Reconstruction of Social Studies    29
Volume 34 (1) 2018
viability. Contemporary society gets linked to the “continuous human community”44 
by way of its consolidation, expansion and transformation of values. 
Dewey defends the value of intellectual (moral, cultural, or social) freedom, 
having distinguished it from both political (suffrage) and economic (opportunity 
and security) freedom. While he acknowledges that schools notably contribute to 
the achievement of political and economic freedom, he argues that their singular 
and ultimate purpose is to protect and promote intellectual freedom. Schools do 
this by developing “free inquiry, discussion and expression.”45 If “the spirit of free 
intelligence” is to pervade the school, however, then ideas and inquiries must be 
genuine; they must not be sham, trivial, or irrelevant.46 They must originate in per-
sonal reflection, which, as we explain later in the section, necessarily implies a social 
context, even if the students are not made aware of it. The point we wish to under-
score here is that the ideas entertained in school are not innocent; they contribute 
to the kinds of persons that students become.47 Thus, Dewey writes, “the schools 
have also the responsibility of seeing to it that those who leave its walls have ideas 
that are worth thinking and worth being expressed, as well as having the courage 
to express them against the opposition of reactionaries and standpatters.”48
Dewey seeks to establish criticism as an integral feature of experience, culture, 
and schooling. He defines human well-being as the continuous and detailed engage-
ment of critical reflection within the context of living a meaningful life, referring 
to such critical reflection as philosophy—the name was “familiar and convenient” 
and it invokes love of wisdom.49 From our perspective, given that we are consider-
ing K–12 schools, Dewey might have more aptly named this engagement of criti-
cal reflection “social studies,” for social studies, like the form of philosophy that 
Dewey advocates, ideally deals with “the conflicts and difficulties of social life.”50
Not everything called “philosophy,” however, fits this bill. Indeed, Dewey’s 
critique of professional philosophy in particular, as well as his functionalist account 
of knowledge, is necessary for reimagining a Deweyan mode of social studies edu-
cation. In Reconstruction of Philosophy, Dewey criticizes professional philosophers 
for their “ambitious pretensions,” their assumption that the rigors of contempla-
tion have been entrusted to their “sacred priesthood,”51 and their erroneous belief 
that their command of logic makes them uniquely qualified to tackle the “techni-
cal problems of abstruse philosophy.”52 Dewey’s chief concern is that philosophical 
inquiry is conceived as an end in itself and, for this reason, need not serve human 
life. Instead of being grounded in and motivated by our human creatureliness—
our hungers, fears, conflicts, needs, desires, and aspirations—it answers only to the 
questions of what exists, what can be thought, and what can be known.
Dewey argues that the received view of professional philosophy is profoundly 
mistaken. It has failed to take its lead from the empirical sciences, which conceive 
of objectivity as relative or relational, not fixed by God or Nature, and as a “a range of 
applicability” with no final conclusions.53 Scientific theory has lost its absoluteness, 
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having passed into a set of provisional hypotheses. The scientific method is experi-
mental and self-corrective, making it possible for scientists to learn just as much 
from their failures as they do their successes. Like scientific inquiry, philosophy 
should become essentially open-ended, active, hypothetical, experimental, and criti-
cal. It must develop instruments for the investigation of human life and its social 
institutions. To this end, Dewey encourages recognition of philosophy’s origin 
in culture. Humans live by means of words and symbols to which they are “most 
deeply and passionately attached.”54 Thus, “the material out of which philosophy 
finally emerges . . . is figurative, symbolic of fears and hopes, made of imaginations 
and suggestions . . . [i]t is poetry and drama.”55 If our experience carries within it 
practical principles of connection and organization, then it is possible to “use our 
past experiences to construct new and better ones in the future.”56 In such a con-
text, philosophy changes from being contemplative to being operative. While pro-
fessional philosophers can continue to debate the ends toward which individuals 
should direct their lives, they should do so with greater awareness of the material 
conditions and means, and acknowledge that these ends are “a collection of imag-
ined possibilities that stimulates men to new efforts and realizations.”57 If ends are 
the instrumentalities of action, then we need ends that in their implementation 
will form the “right mental and moral habitudes in respect of the difficulties of 
contemporary social life.”58 Ultimately, professional philosophers must abandon 
their pretensions and recognize that “the work can be done only by the resolute, 
patient, cooperative activities of men and women of good will, drawn from every 
useful calling, over an indefinitely long period.”59
What does all this have to do with social studies education? The current 
view of social studies, much like the received view of professional philosophy that 
Dewey critiques, is circumscribed by a set of aims that represent only a small frac-
tion of its proper function. It is viewed as a curricular subject that answers only the 
question of what can or cannot be known. Thus, the field of social studies needs 
its own reconstruction. Social theories need to be viewed as hypotheses that may 
or may not promote a kind of growth. As hypotheses, they take on the same dual, 
meaning-making function that Dewey attributes to criticism: they are conservative 
in that they alert us to traditional values that we want to retain and live by; they 
are prospective in that they seek to ground the unfurling of possible future goods.
A reconstruction of the aims of social studies education will drastically impact 
the daily routines of schools. The school is not merely preparation for a life des-
tined to be lived in “the real world.” Instead, it is life itself. The social dimension of 
school-as-life should not be conceived as an “add-on”; rather, it should be the basis 
of everything that happens in schools. All areas of study should be viewed as “means 
of bringing the child to realize the social scene of action.”60 There are two underlying 
claims here, both of which Dewey defends: subject matter must be presented within 
the context of the students’ lives; and students should be encouraged to seek out and 
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interpret subject matter in light of their own social ends or values. Thus, Dewey tasks 
the school with developing social intelligence, social power, and social interests.
Although Dewey addresses geography and history, he does not treat them as 
discrete curricular subjects. Instead, he conceives of them as contextualizing the 
social nature of such abstract disciplines as mathematics and literature. In other 
words, geography and history teach students to be mindful of the material and cul-
tural conditions—economics, demographics, and politics—that underlie any dis-
ciplinary inquiry. It is necessary for all teachers and students to become cognizant 
of these social dimensions because their import is not limited to the social studies 
curriculum. Every subject must be approached from a social standpoint—as express-
ing social life and influencing social development—because such an approach will 
ensure that the school moves to “eliminate the chief causes of intolerance, persecu-
tion, fanaticism, and the use of differences to create class wars.”61
The advantage of viewing the school and, more specifically, the K–12 cur-
riculum in this way is that it gives these ideas a chance to become “motive-forces 
in the guidance of conduct.”62 It allows schools to make a difference in the future 
lives of individuals and communities, cultivating behavior that is “more enlight-
ened, more consistent, more vigorous than it would otherwise be.”63 This behav-
ior is more enlightened, consistent, and vigorous because it is grounded in a rich 
understanding of the past and guided by dreams for the future that are realistically 
rooted in the resources of the present. Given the seriousness of the global issues fac-
ing current and future generations, there is abundant need for this type of critical 
education, of an active sense of the past that works toward the future rather than an 
unnecessarily specialized one that is inert. Dewey concludes that moral education 
does not consist in “isolated moral lessons upon the importance of truthfulness 
and honesty,” nor does it involve instructing students in such virtues as patience 
or courage.64 These conceptions are “too narrow, too formal, and too pathological,” 
and together they have contributed to a “too goody-goody” vision of the moral.65 
For Dewey, a genuinely moral education forms “habits of social imagination and 
conception.”66 In his view, moral motives, behaviors, and forces “are nothing more 
or less than social intelligence—the power of observing and comprehending social 
situations, and social power—trained capacities of control—at work in the service 
of social interest and aims.”67
Given that progressives are critiqued and caricatured for their perceived lack 
of academic rigor, it is important to underscore that Dewey was not antitheoretical. 
Despite an emphasis on experimentation, he acknowledged the role of authority 
and precedent in social inquiry.68 Although he did not consider theory “a substitute 
for personal reflective choice,” he nonetheless believed that it served to enlighten 
and guide choice by revealing alternatives, and by bringing to light what is entailed 
when we choose one alternative rather than another.69 Dewey criticized an over-
reliance upon theory, particularly when it was favored over more commonsense 
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explanations, and he criticized social theories that were exclusively critical or exclu-
sively conservative. Ultimately, he favored social theories that demonstrate “practi-
cal power or efficacy.”70 To project and direct social betterment, these theories have 
to take as their starting point the social, political, and economic situations that 
present us with choices about and demands on how we live. Such theorizing is far 
from being a remote intellectual exercise; rather, it is “hard and obnoxious” because 
it interrupts established, collective habits and precipitates criticism of existing cus-
toms and institutions.71 Yet without such thinking, “old truths become so stale and 
worn that they cease to be truths and become mere dictates of external authority.”72
Thus, humans must discover new truths, and they can do so with the aid 
of (theoretical) reflection and experimentation.73 For example, Dewey argues that 
while students are not in a position to buy or sell property from one another, it is 
possible for them to reflect on whether property is equitably distributed in society 
and, if not, whether they wish to do anything about it. In other words, students use 
what they learn to develop personal conviction and resolve in an effort to assume 
greater responsibility for their individual and collective decision-making. The stu-
dents’ personal understandings are broadened to include knowledge of, and reflec-
tion upon, social systems and institutions. They are also enriched by the students’ 
awareness of which social conditions should inform their deliberations if they are 
to be effective.74 The broadening and deepening of the students’ understandings is a 
vitally important step in the maturation process: students learn to make informed, 
reflective judgments about what is desirable, rather than acting uncritically, hastily, 
and haphazardly on their express desires.75 Students revise their desires and pur-
poses in light of what they have learned to be the probable consequences of a given 
pursuit, and thereby act with greater foresight and imagination. 
Dewey refers to this kind of reflection and experimentation as “instruction in 
the art of living,” and he uses the analogy of friendship to illustrate its distinctness 
from more abstract and rigid forms of instruction.76 He argues that it is impossible 
to develop a friendship based merely on information. A friendship develops, between 
Bill and Megan, let’s say, if their knowledge and understanding of each other serves 
to expand their modes of response—if they seek to revise their desires and purposes 
in light of how they imagine the other will react and behave. To do this, Megan must 
effectively learn to see with Bill’s eyes, hear with his ears, and think with his mind—
and vice-versa. In other words, a friend teaches, but without the intent to teach.77 To 
become friends, Megan and Bill must communicate and participate in each other’s 
values, but without these values having to be strictly marked off from one another and 
explicitly articulated as such. Bill presents Megan with the embodiment of ideals that 
command his thoughts and desires—and vice-versa. Thus, Bill and Megan’s friend-
ship keeps alive the possibility that their values are open to reconstruction as they 
continue to interact with each other, just as students’ ideals are open to reconstruction 
as they continue to interact critically and reflectively with social custom and habit.
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Throughout his career, Dewey never wavered in his conviction that think-
ing betters the individual, the community, and the community’s environment. As 
Dewey put it:
Without freedom, search for new truth and the disclosure of new paths in 
which humanity may walk more securely and justly come to an end. Free-
dom which is liberation of the individual, is the ultimate assurance of the 
movement of society toward more humane and noble ends. He who would 
put the freedom of others in bond, especially freedom of inquiry and com-
munication, creates conditions which finally imperil his own freedom and 
that of his offspring. Eternal vigilance is the price of the conservation and 
extension of freedom, and the schools should [be] the ceaseless guardians 
and creators of this vigilance.78 
Social Studies Reconsidered
There are some strong parallels between what Dewey imagined as the socially 
reconstructive power of education and the role that social studies might occupy 
in schools. The specialized social studies programs that are currently widespread, 
however, bear little resemblance to Dewey’s conception of educating young people 
from within a culture to inhabit it more fully, and to develop a practice of criticism 
through which that culture might be constantly reconstructed. Thus, in the interest 
of reimagining what social studies might look like in light of Dewey’s thinking, we 
offer a series of recalibrations that could help bring the field of social studies into 
closer alignment with a thick conception of Deweyan theory. 
The first recalibration we suggest is to orient social studies education away from 
its focus on descriptive knowledge and toward a Deweyan conception of knowledge: 
understanding that is always pressing toward the future. Much of what currently con-
stitutes learning in social studies classrooms might be categorized as naming/think-
ing/knowing: to know something is to be able to name it and think about it. In these 
classrooms, the goal of learning is to develop familiarity with historical epochs and fig-
ures, political institutions and procedures, and economic tendencies and mechanisms. 
Largely missing from these classrooms is an emphasis on the kind of understanding of 
a situation that positions one to posit, theorize, and imagine into an uncertain future. 
Knowing about historical antecedents of contemporary circumstances, such as the 
ongoing global migrant crises, is of limited value: it can help us name the cause of the 
crisis, but it does little to help us imagine how we could go on to fix it. A robust explo-
ration of what is happening now, however, with an eye toward what can and ought to 
be done in the near and more distant future, could yield the kind of knowledge that 
would help us address this crisis. Thus an orientation toward knowledge, one more in 
keeping with pragmatic thought of Dewey, would be superior insofar as it would help 
students to more than merely describe their world; it would help them reimagine it.
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Second, we suggest that the field of social studies recalibrate its approach to 
communication around, through, and across difference. The increasing specializa-
tion of social studies has fragmented the discipline, thus causing isolation not only 
from other fields of study but also among the component sub-disciplines that now 
comprise the field itself. Developing a robust social democracy, however, requires the 
free and full interplay of communication. Indeed, the importance of communicative 
experience is profoundly important for Dewey; his philosophy relies on its capacity 
to shape what we know of our world and its points of intersection with our selves.79 
He believed there was crucial value in the reconstruction of experience in light of 
the experiences of the other, which signals the importance of a milieu of difference 
and otherness, one that invites the communicative mixing needed for social better-
ment. This sense of otherness is crucial for social studies and its value far outstrips 
that of the particularism about identity current in the field.80 Thus our suggestion 
is to recalibrate social studies as a field in which students are brought into conversa-
tions with otherness not in order to solidify identities, but in order to germinate new 
social landscapes of participation and development across and about all difference. 
The third recalibration we wish to suggest is the expansion and integration 
of social studies throughout all scholastic disciplines. The field of social studies has 
become “schooled”: divided within and among itself and cordoned off from the wider 
society of school and beyond that it seeks to reinvent. Social studies education in its 
current iteration is a far cry from the broadly social forward-moving discourse of 
connectivity of which Dewey had dreamed. Dewey imagined that schools themselves 
would have little utility as societies took up their truly educative purpose, a state of 
affairs perhaps best illuminated by his imagined visit to a future, utopian society: 
I inquired, having a background of our own schools in mind, how with their 
methods they ever made sure that the children and youth really learned 
anything, how they mastered the subject matter, geography and arithmetic 
and history, and how they ever were sure that they really learned to read 
and write and figure. Here, too, at first I came upon a blank wall. For they 
asked, in return to my question, whether in the period from which I came 
for a visit to Utopia it was possible for a boy or girl who was normal physi-
ologically to grow up without learning the things which he or she needed 
to learn—because it was evident to them that it was not possible for any 
one except a congenital idiot to be born and to grow up without learning. 
When they discovered, however, that I was serious, they asked whether it 
was true that in our day we had to have schools and teachers and exami-
nations to make sure that babies learned to walk and to talk. It was during 
these conversations that I learned to appreciate how completely the whole 
concept of acquiring and storing away things had been displaced by the 
concept of creating attitudes by shaping desires and developing the needs 
that are significant in the process of living.81
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Dewey’s vision of education, though admittedly futuristic and utopian, is not 
outside the purview of contemporary schools when social studies education is recon-
ceived on the model we have proposed in the preceding pages. This way of thinking 
about society, about culture, about others, and about our capacity to critically theo-
rize what is and what might be, rests deep in the DNA of social studies. If it is to be 
realized, however, care will need to be taken to wind the field out of the disciplinary 
ruts and present a more robust examination of the social in light of all that is possible. 
The final question that remains is, precisely how will this reconstruction of the 
social studies be realized? As will have become apparent, we are not calling for more 
social studies teachers. Instead, we are calling for teachers who have the ability to socially 
situate their inquiries. What does this mean in practice? It means that educators have 
a responsibility to learn about the aesthetic, ethical, political, and social dimensions of 
what they teach, whether it be algebraic equations or Shakespeare. Our argument has 
been that social studies is the kind of activity that beings like us should be engaged in: 
because we exist socially, we must reflect communally about the things that matter to 
us. Simply put, social studies education makes sense for us in light of who we are. To be 
engaged with the difficulties of social life is to be engaged with eternal questions. The 
teacher’s commitment to inquiring into these eternal questions and reflecting upon our 
shared life is vital for the classroom, as it conveys to students the importance of engaging 
in their own processes of inquiry and reflection. This commitment both demonstrates 
and catalyzes what Dewey recognized as the transformative power of social education.82 
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